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MATTERS OF THE HEART—KEEPING 
PACE WITH SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND 
THE LAW IN DEACTIVATION OF 
CARDIOVASCULAR IMPLANTABLE 
ELECTRONIC DEVICES, INCLUDING 
PACEMAKERS 
James H. Pietsch* 
Pacemakers have been around for over half a century. However, despite the frequent 
use of pacemakers as a medical device, a decision to turn a pacemaker off can still 
prompt difficult legal and ethical questions. This Article focuses on a ninety-one-year 
old retired US Navy veteran who wanted to know if he could have his pacemaker deac-
tivated. Whether deactivating a pacemaker will immediately lead to the death of a pa-
tient is dependent on that patient’s specific heart condition but, under most circum-
stances, deactivating a pacemaker can be differentiated from physician-assisted 
suicide. This Article will explore the various laws and professional guidelines that 
govern decisions to deactivate cardiovascular implantable electronic devices, includ-
ing pacemakers, and will also explore the laws and regulations that federal health care 
facilities, including military medical treatment facilities, must adhere to when decid-
ing whether to deactivate such devices.   
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The author was approached by a ninety-one-year-old retired 
military member’s family with respect to legal/bioethical issues relat-
ed to the retiree’s health care received at an Army Medical Center (not 
a Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center, although the retiree 
is, of course, also a veteran). The issues centered on the patient’s de-
sire to have his pacemaker deactivated. He had done some research 
on the subject and cited the Heart Rhythm Society (HRS) “Consensus 
Statement on the Management of Cardiovascular Implantable Elec-
tronic Devices (CIEDs)” in “Patients Nearing End of Life or Request-
ing Withdrawal of Therapy”1 to support his request. He did not see 
this as assisted suicide (even though he may not survive without the 
pacemaker), but only as a question of his choice about “whether or not 
to have artificial support in his body.” He does not think of himself as 
“terminal.” While there is no certainty that he would die immediately 
if the pacemaker is deactivated, it is not unlikely.2 The Army cardiolo-
gist was supportive and, later, an appointment was scheduled to talk 
                                                                                                                             
 1. Rachel Lampert et al., HRS Expert Consensus Statement on the Management 
of Cardiovascular Implantable Electronic Devices (CIEDs) in Patients Nearing End of Life 
or Requesting Withdrawal of Therapy, 7 HEART RHYTHM. 1008 (2010) [hereinafter 
Lampert]. This document was developed in collaboration and endorsed by the 
American College of Cardiology (ACC), the American Geriatrics Society (AGS), 
the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine (AAHPM); the Ameri-
can Heart Association (AHA), the European Heart Rhythm Association (EHRA), 
and the Hospice and Palliative Nurses Association (HPNA). This consensus state-
ment will be discussed in detail in this article. See also Luigi Padeletti et al., EHRA 
Expert Consensus Statement on the management of cardiovascular implantable electronic 
devices in patients nearing end of life or requesting withdrawal of therapy, 12 EUROPACE 
1480 (2010) [hereinafter Padeletti]. 
 2. Summary of patient’s health care from the perspective of his current car-
diologist (on file with the author) states:   
The patient is a retired Navy Captain (O-6). The patient has a history 
of a tachycardia mediated cardiomyopathy diagnosed after his cardi-
ac bypass surgery for coronary artery disease. Based on the doctor’s 
review of the records, there was significant difficulty keeping him in a 
normal rhythm and he had significant fatigue from heart rate lower-
ing medications, though they appear to have been effective. For this 
reason he was referred for atrial flutter ablation, but he continued to 
have symptomatic atrial fibrillation, so AV node ablation and perma-
nent pacemaker were performed. AV node ablation is destruction of 
the AV node so that it can no longer transmit electrical impulses from 
the top chambers of the heart to the bottom chambers. This makes the 
patient dependent on a pacemaker for their heart to beat at an appro-
priate rate to maintain daily function. The current cardiologist did not 
have access to the previous cardiologist’s notes, so she could not 
comment on any discussions he and the patient had prior to this pro-
cedure. She could report that the patient was advised that he would 
be pacemaker dependent after this procedure, but she did not see any 
documentation of discussions regarding deactivation.  
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more about the deactivation. The hospital ethics committee was con-
vened to address the question and, in the process, a request for legal 
advice was sought. The Center Judge Advocate sought guidance from 
the Staff Judge Advocate at their headquarters, the United States Ar-
my Medical Command (MEDCOM), which issued an opinion that 
“such a deactivation would constitute ‘physician-assisted suicide’ un-
der the Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997,3 
which prohibits using federal funds to support physician-assisted sui-
cide.”4 However, this opinion did not address exceptions in the statute 
relating to the withholding or withdrawing of medical treatment or 
medical care,5 the heart of the story that now begins. 
  
                                                                                                                             
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 14401 (2012) (“(a) Findings Congress finds the following:  
(1) The Federal Government provides financial support for the provi-
sion of and payment for health care services, as well as for advocacy 
activities to protect the rights of individuals. 
(2) Assisted suicide, euthanasia, and mercy killing have been criminal 
offenses throughout the United States and, under current law, it 
would be unlawful to provide services in support of such illegal activ-
ities. 
(3) Because of recent legal developments, it may become lawful in ar-
eas of the United States to furnish services in support of such activi-
ties. 
(4) Congress is not providing Federal financial assistance in support 
of assisted suicide, euthanasia, and mercy killing and intends that 
Federal funds not be used to promote such activities. 
(b) Purpose It is the principal purpose of this chapter to continue cur-
rent Federal policy by providing explicitly that Federal funds may not 
be used to pay for items and services (including assistance) the pur-
pose of which is to cause (or assist in causing) the suicide, euthanasia, 
or mercy killing of any individual.”). 
 4. Email from patient to author (May 16, 2016) (on file with author).  
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 14402 (2012) (“(b) Construction and treatment of certain ser-
vices Nothing in subsection (a) of this section, or in any other provision of this 
chapter (or in any amendment made by this chapter), shall be construed to apply 
to or to affect any limitation relating to-- 
(1) the withholding or withdrawing of medical treatment or medical care; 
(2) the withholding or withdrawing of nutrition or hydration; 
(3) abortion; or 
(4) the use of an item, good, benefit, or service furnished for the purpose of allevi-
ating pain or discomfort, even if such use may increase the risk of death, so long as 
such item, good, benefit, or service is not also furnished for the purpose of causing, 
or the purpose of assisting in causing, death, for any reason.”). 
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Pacemakers6 
Pacemakers (PM2) have been around for over half a century.
7 In 
1958, the Veterans Administration invented the implantable cardiac 
pacemaker, “helping many patients prevent potentially life-
threatening complications from irregular heartbeats.”8 The procedure 
is not complicated although the device is sophisticated. According to 
the Department of Veterans Affairs9: 
A pacemaker is a small electronic device that helps your heart’s 
electrical system. It keeps your heart beating at the right pace. In-
serting the pacemaker into your body is called IMPLANTATION. You 
stay awake during the procedure. You may be asked some ques-




                                                                                                                             
 6. The author believes that a descriptive summary of pacemakers is helpful 
to understand the issues presented in this article. The Department of Veterans Af-
fairs pioneered the development of implantable cardiac devices including pace-
makers and its description is used in this article. 
 7. See generally William M. Chardack et al., A Transistorized, Self-contained, 
Implantable Pacemaker for the Long-term Correction of Complete Heart Block, 48 
SURGERY 643 (1960) [hereinafter Chardack].   
 8. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., TIMELINE OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS (Jan. 12, 
2017), http://www.research.va.gov/about/history.cfm; see also Chardack, supra 
note 7, at 654; William M. Chardack, Andrew A. Gage, & Wilson Greatbatch, A 
transistorized, self-contained, implantable pacemaker for the long-term correction of com-
plete heart block, 48 SURGERY 643, 654 (1960). 
 9. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., HEALTH ENCYCLOPEDIA (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://www.veteranshealthlibrary.org/Encyclopedia/142,82031_VA (defining 
pacemakers). 
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During the Procedure 
• A LOCAL ANESTHETIC IS GIVEN by injection to numb the area 
where the pacemaker will be inserted. This keeps you from 
feeling pain during the procedure. 
• AN INCISION IS MADE where the generator is placed. 
• THE LEAD (TRANSMITS TO AND FROM YOUR HEART) IS GUIDED 
through a vein into your heart’s chambers using x-ray moni-
tors. 
• THE PACEMAKER GENERATOR IS ATTACHED to the lead or leads. 
• THE PACEMAKER’S SETTINGS ARE PROGRAMMED to help your heart 
beat at a rate that’s right for you. 
After the Procedure 
• You will stay in the hospital a day or two. 
• Your pacemaker settings will be rechecked. 
• Follow the instructions you are given for caring for the implan-
tation site. You will likely be told not to raise the arm on that 
side for a certain amount of time. 
• Take your temperature and check your incision for signs of in-
fection every day for a week. 
• Return for a follow-up visit as directed by our staff. 
ICDs10 
An ICD is a device that is placed permanently inside your body. 
An ICD monitors your heart rhythm (the speed and pattern of 
your heartbeat). If this rhythm becomes too fast or too slow, the 
ICD sends out electrical signals (including either pacing, or some-
times, high-energy shocks) that help bring the rhythm back to 
normal. The ICD is put inside your body during a minor surgical 
procedure called IMPLANTATION. In most cases, implantation takes 
1 to 3 hours. 
  
                                                                                                                             
 10. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., HEALTH ENCYCLOPEDIA (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://www.veteranshealthlibrary.org/TestsTreatments/Treatments/142,82025_
VA (defining Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator (ICD)). 
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How the ICD Is Put into the Body 
The ICD is usually implanted on the left side of your chest. Im-
plantation does not require open-heart surgery (your chest will 
not be opened). During implantation: 
•  An incision is made in the skin below the collarbone. This cre-
ates a “pocket” to hold the ICD. 
• A lead (wire) is threaded through the incision into a vein in the 
upper chest. With the help of x-ray monitors, the lead is then 
guided into one of the heart’s chambers. Depending on how 
many leads your ICD has, this process may be repeated to 
guide leads into other chambers. 
• The leads are attached to the heart muscle so they will stay in 
place. 
• The generator (battery) is attached to the leads. Then the genera-
tor is placed in its pocket under the skin. 
• A fast heart rhythm may be induced (started) to test the ICD. 
• When everything else is done, the incision is closed with su-
tures, medical glue, or staples. 
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Other Implantation Sites 
In some cases, the ICD can be put elsewhere in the body. This 
could be in the abdomen, on the right side of the chest, or on the 
left side under the muscle. If one of these is an option for you, 
your doctor will explain more. 
AFTER THE PROCEDURE 
You’ll stay in the hospital at least overnight. While in the hospital, 
your heart’s signals are monitored to see how the ICD is working. 
You can go home when your condition is stable. Once you get 
home: 
Follow your discharge instructions to care for your incision. 
Watch for signs of infection (see box). 
Follow any special instructions to care for the side of your body 
where your ICD was implanted. Your doctor may tell you not to 
raise that arm above the shoulder for a certain amount of time. 
You’ll likely have bruising at the incision site for about a month. 
This is normal and will go away as the incision heals. 
You can probably return to your normal routine soon after im-
plantation. Ask your doctor when you can return to work. 
You may be instructed not to drive for a certain amount of time. 
See your doctor for follow-up visits as recommended. 
NOTE: THE ICD BATTERY WILL NEED TO BE REPLACED EVERY FEW 
YEARS. TALK WITH YOUR DOCTOR TO LEARN MORE. 
There are probably several million Americans with cardiovascu-
lar implantable electronic devices (CIEDs) such as pacemakers and de-
fibrillators and at least 225,000 pacemakers and 133,000 defibrillators 
are implanted each year, but few discussions about deactivation seem 
to occur prior to implantation.11 These devices can help sustain life, 
but they can also prolong the dying process or even the suffering of 
patients who may have debilitating medical conditions. Most patients 
with CIEDs are not prepared to address the issue.12 A study of Mayo 
Clinic patients showed that patients seeking to deactivate their CIEDs 
share a common profile13: they are mostly male, old, and very sick.14 
                                                                                                                             
 11. See Harry G. Mond & Alessandro Proclemer, M.D., The 11th World Survey 
of Cardiac Pacing and Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators: Calendar Year 2009–A 
World Society of Arrhythmia's Project, 34 PACE 1013 (2011); see also Paula Span, A 
Decision Deferred: Turning Off the Pacemaker (Jan. 29, 2014), http://newoldage. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/a-decision-deferred-turning-off-the-pacemaker/; 
Lillian C. Buchalter et al., Features and Outcomes of Patients Who Underwent Cardiac 
Device Deactivation, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MEDICINE 80, 81 (Jan. 2014), http:// 
jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/1783304?resultClick
=1. 
 12. Buchalter, supra note 11, at 82. In a survey of 150 patients at the Mayo 
Clinic, more than half had signed advance directives, but of those, only one specif-
ically mentioned a CIED.  
 13. See generally id. 
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More than half of the patients with CIEDs surveyed had advance di-
rectives.15 However, almost none of those advance directives ad-
dressed the patient’s implanted device.16 
 Unwanted CIEDs may seriously impair quality of life for pa-
tients.17 In a survey of patients with implantable cardioverter-
defibrillators (ICDs), during the last few weeks of their lives, twenty 
percent of the patients received shocks which were painful and the 
experience greatly increased the stress of patients and their families.18 
By contrast, deactivation of a pacemaker is a painless process.19 A 
pacemaker may be remotely programmed to lower its output render-
ing it non-functional, while the functions of an ICD can be suspended 
by simply placing a magnet over it.20 
While implanting CIEDs has become a standard practice, the 
prospect of deactivating them is still often uncertain. What is certain is 
that all patients with implanted CIEDs will eventually die, either be-
cause of their heart conditions or the development of another terminal 
illness.21 Physicians, nurses, and other health care providers are in-
creasingly dealing with the prospect of CIED deactivation.22 In a study 
of health care providers who primarily interacted with patients with 
CIEDs, most had participated in device deactivations.23 However, 
many physicians, patients, and families report uneasiness in discuss-
ing the topic of managing the devices, especially in the context of end-
of-life decision-making.24 
 Implantation of CIEDs is a standard service provided to author-
ized military healthcare beneficiaries such as the patient who is the 
subject of this article.25 TRICARE, the health care program that pro-
vides health benefits to military members and veterans, covers the 
                                                                                                                             
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See generally Lampert, supra note 1. 
 18. Id. at 1008. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1021. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 1015. 
 23. Paul S. Mueller et al., Deactivating Implanted Cardiac Devices in Terminally Ill 
Patients, 31 PACE 560 (May 2008) [hereinafter Mueller]. 
 24. Lampert, supra note 1, at 1008. 
 25. See TRICARE REIMBURSEMENT MANUAL: PERSPECTIVE PAYMENT 
METHODOLOGY 6010.58-M, at 33 (Feb. 1, 2008), http://manuals.tricare.osd.mil/ 
DisplayManualPdfFile/TO08/1/AsOf/TR08/C13S3.PDF. 
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cost of implantation and replacement of CIEDs, such as pacemakers.26 
While CIEDs are readily available, the existing military healthcare 
program should address not only implantation, but also continued 
maintenance of and potential deactivation of CIEDs, to improve pa-
tient autonomy and to enhance informed consent. 
The Heart of the Matter: Whether cardiac devices may be 
withdrawn or deactivated if therapy is ineffective, no 
longer needed, or not desired. 
 Deactivation of pacemakers has been the subject of much dis-
cussion over the years.27 Stopping a cardiac pacemaker may lead to 
death within minutes, or may not be a factor in the final cause of 
                                                                                                                             
 26. Id. 
 27. See, e.g. Mueller, supra note 23. This article describes the practices and atti-
tudes of physicians, nurses, and other health-care workers regarding deactivation 
of pacemakers and ICDs in terminally ill patients; see also Eric Widera, Is Deactivat-
ing a Cardiac Pacemaker Euthanasia? GERIPAL: A GERIATRICS AND PALLIATIVE CARE 
BLOG (September 4, 2014), http://www.geripal.org/2014/09/deactivating-
cardiac-pacemaker.html. The focus of the blog is to separate deactivation of pacing 
devices from euthanasia (or physician-assisted suicide). The blog explains that the 
main difference between deactivation and euthanasia is intent. The intent behind 
both euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide is “relief of suffering through 
death.” However, the main intent in pacemaker deactivation is to respect the pa-
tients’ or surrogates’ choice to discontinue an unwanted medical treatment. The 
blogger emphasizes that even though death might result, “death is not the means 
to meeting the intent of deactivation.” See also Dario Pasalic et al., “The Prevalence 
and Contents of Advance Directives in Patients with Pacemakers,” NAT’L INST. OF 
HEALTH, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3981886/pdf/nihms 
531503.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2017). This article is about a retrospective review 
of the medical records of residents of Olmstead County, MN, who underwent im-
plantation of cardiac pacemaker2 at Mayo Clinic during 2006 and 2007 and deter-
mined the prevalence and contents of advance directives in these patients.  
Results/conclusions: more than half of the patients with pacemakers had executed 
an advance directive but only one had specifically mentioned her pacemaker in 
her advance directive. Therefore, patients with pacemakers should be encouraged 
to execute advance directives and specifically mention their end-of-life device 
management in their advance directive (doing so may help prevent end-of-life eth-
ical dilemmas).  
The article also states that it is ethically and legally permissible to deactivate a car-
diac pacemaker, so long as the patient or the surrogate has given informed con-
sent. Sufficient informed consent must include the consequences of, and alterna-
tives to, deactivation. Furthermore, the article recommends adding pacemaker 
deactivation into a patient’s advanced directive to minimize ethical dilemmas at 
the end of life; AMA, Heart Devices Can Be Turned Off Near End of Life; AMEDNEWS 
(May 31, 2010), http://www.amednews.com/article/20100531/profession/ 
305319943/4/. This article discusses the ethical and legal justification for cardiac 
pacemaker deactivation set out by the Heart Rhythm Society’s Consensus State-
ment. 
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death.28 Even prior to the Heart Rhythm Society consensus statement, 
healthcare providers had discussions whether cardiac devices may be 
withdrawn or deactivated if therapy is ineffective, no longer needed, 
or not desired.29 Some argue that disabling ICD shocks is analogous to 
a do-not-resuscitate order and is ethically permissible whereas with-
drawing pacing from a pacemaker-dependent patient is an act of in-
tentionally hastening death and not morally licit.30 Some suggest that 
the right to refuse treatment applies to treatments involving ongoing 
physician agency and that this right cannot underwrite patient de-
mands that physicians reverse the effects of treatments previously 
administered in which ongoing physician agency is no longer impli-
cated, such as the permanently indwelling pacemaker.31 Deactivating 
ICDs as opposed to pacemakers does not seem to be controversial un-
der most circumstances.32 
Some suggest that physicians ought to initiate a deactivation 
conversation, whether for ICDs or PMs, ideally at the time of implan-
tation.33 Some also suggest that the institutions that serve patients with 
such devices should promulgate guidelines for deactivation.34 The 
subject has been discussed for decades,35 and there are continuing sto-
                                                                                                                             
 28. RJ Reitemeier et al., Retiring the Pacemaker, HASTINGS CENT. REP. 24, 24-26 
(Jan. 1997), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3528022.pdf [hereinafter Reitemei-
er]. 
 29. Debra Lynn-McHale Wiegard & Peggy G. Kalowes, Withdrawal of Cardiac 
Medications and Devices, 18 AACN ADVANCED CRITICAL CARE 415, 415-425 (Dec. 
2007), http://www.nursingcenter.com/journalarticle?Article_ID=751941#P120. 
 30. See, e.g., G. Neal Kaye & Frank Pelosi, An Ethical Analysis of Withdrawal of 
Therapy in Patients with Implantable Cardiac Electronic Devices: Application of a Novel 
Decision Algorithm, 80 THE LINACRE QUARTERLY 308, 308-16 (Oct. 2013).  
 31. See, e.g., Thomas Stewart Huddle & F. Amos Bailey, Pacemaker Deactiva-
tion: Withdrawal of Support or Active Ending of Life, 33 THEORETICAL MED. AND 
BIOETHICS 421, 421-33 (Feb. 2012) (outlining some of the theoretical objections to 
deactivating a pacemaker). 
 32. See, e.g., Daniel B. Kramer et al., Time for a Change—A New Approach to ICD 
Replacement, 366 N. ENGL. J. MED. 291, 291-93 (Jan. 26, 2012). In discussing ICDs the 
authors indicate “[f]or many patients, changes in values and preferences since ini-
tial implantation may shift the balance of risks and benefits of device therapy. For 
example, progressive heart failure or end-stage renal disease with multiple hospi-
talizations may change a patient’s perspective on sudden death in relation to other 
possible outcomes. . . .”   
 33. See, e.g., Cynthiane Morgenweck, Ethical Considerations for Discontinuing 
Pacemakers and Automatic Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators at the End-of-Life, 26 
CURRENT OP. IN ANAESTHESIOLOGY 171, 171-75 (Mar. 2013). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., Reitemeier, supra note 28. The particular case studies Mr. S, a sev-
enty-four year old male resident in a skilled nursing facility. Mr. S became ill with 
a cardiac condition, which required bypass eighteen years prior to the study and 
then a pacemaker five years before. Mr. S’s mental health deteriorated to an extent 
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ries of families struggling with this issue, but doctors and patients do 
not seem to be prepared.36 
Clinical Practice Guidelines (CPGs) 
 Increasingly, clinical practice guidelines are being incorporated 
into the practice of medicine to provide healthcare providers (and ul-
timately, patients) guidelines covering a variety of medical practices.37 
                                                                                                                             
that his wife (Mrs. S) of fifty years could no longer care for him at home. Dementia 
and Alzheimer’s made recognition of his wife, his son, and the medical staff nearly 
impossible. These ailments have progressed enough so that Mr. S does not express 
any willful desires, is confined to bed, neither initiates nor refuses movement, and 
does not communicate at all. Mr. S has a DNR order that also prohibits any artifi-
cial nutrition or hydration. Everyone involved agrees that Mr. S would not wish to 
continue living in this state and would request termination of medication and de-
activation of his pacemaker. A problem arises when Mr. S’s internist agrees to dis-
continue the cardiac medication but does not agree to deactivate the pacemaker 
without a cardiologist’s approval. The cardiologist refused to even discuss pace-
maker deactivation and the manufacturer technicians said they could not turn it 
off without a physician’s order. In their commentary, Paul Reitemeier and Arthur 
Derse conclude that patients have the right to request withdrawal or termination 
of any medical treatment, regardless of whether stopping the therapy will hasten 
death. They further concede that the cardiologist should have discussed this with 
the patient and his family before implanting the pacemakers. Thorough informed 
consent should include alternatives, risks, and the option of refusing treatment al-
together. Furthermore, the cardiologist should have made known any moral 
struggle he had with discontinuing pacemaker treatment prior to implantation. “Is 
an implanted pacemaker a medical treatment that, once begun, can be with-
drawn?” is the main issue at hand, according to another commentator, Jeffrey 
Spike. Spike compares a pacemaker to both an implanted heart valve and a porta-
ble ventilator. It is similar to a heart valve because it is surgically implanted into 
the body and both devices are used until they can no longer function. According to 
Spike, the better analogy is the ventilator because deactivating it does not require 
surgery or an invasive procedure. Furthermore, like ventilators, deactivation can 
cause death within minutes or could not even be a factor in the final cause of 
death. The commentator disagrees with the most common reason given to refuse 
deactivation, that the pacemaker is not burdensome to the patient. He reasons that 
it is unconvincing because a feeding tube is not burdensome, yet feeding tubes are 
regularly “stopped if the life it prolongs is burdensome to the person living it.” 
Finally, a pacemaker is most similar to an ICD. Spike argues that an ICD deactiva-
tion and DNRs should be equally accepted because they are functionally and ethi-
cally the same. Spike concludes that they should find a cardiologist who will deac-
tivate Mr. S’s pacemaker.  
 36. Katy Butler, What Broke My Father’s Heart, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/magazine/20pacemaker-t.html?page 
wanted=all&_r=1. This story is about the life and death of her father, a retired col-
lege professor who had a pacemaker installed shortly after he was diagnosed with 
dementia. Although the patient had signed an advanced directive expressing his 
desire not to have his life prolonged artificially and did not wish to be a burden to 
his wife or children, the family was devastated by its experience in trying to deac-
tivate his pacemaker. 
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Integrating evidence-based medicine (EBM) into the U.S. 
healthcare system is essential to recent healthcare reform strategies 
and one of the main ways to implement EMB is by utilizing clinical 
practice guidelines (CPGs).38 
The U.S. Congress, through the Medicare Improvements for Patients 
and Providers Act of 2008, asked the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to un-
dertake a study on the best methods used in developing clinical prac-
tice guidelines, and the IOM developed eight standards for develop-
ing rigorous, trustworthy clinical practice guidelines.39 
                                                                                                                             
 37. See Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Healthcare Re-
form: An Update, 21 ANNALS OF HEALTH A. 21, 21-33 (2012), http://lawecommons. 
luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=annals. 
 38. Id. at 21. This article highlights some of the main developments in the 
CPG movement over the last two decades and emphasizes “formulating CPGs and 
making them available to practicing physicians is a vital step towards achieving 
and maintaining universal health care (UHC) in the US.” According to the article, 
UHC is “a national regime where all have adequate access to quality health care. 
The following bulleted points are from the article:   
As defined by the IOM in its seminal 1990 report, Clinical Practice Guidelines: Direc-
tions for a New Program, 2 CPGs are "systematically developed statements to assist 
practitioner and patient decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical 
circumstances.” The IOM’s definition has been widely disseminated and adopted. 
CPGs are, then, one of the principal mechanisms through which the results of out-
comes research are put into practice, in pursuit of the important goal of advancing 
EBM. Potential (legal) problem in implementing: To put the matter more starkly, if 
one of the principal purposes of promoting EBM is to move physicians away from 
customary approaches and toward demonstrably more efficient and effective ap-
proaches, but the law continues to use customary practice to define what is legally 
required, physicians who practice EBM might find themselves caught between 
Scylla and Charybdis. The committees concluded their work in early 2011, submit-
ted their reports to Congress, and released them to the public in March 2011. The 
two reports are titled Finding What Works in Health Care: Standards for Systematic 
Reviews and Clinical Practice Guidelines We Can Trust. 
 39. Robin Graham et al., Clinical Practice Guidelines We Can Trust, NAT’L 
ACAD. PRESS (2011), https://www.nap.edu/read/13058/chapter/1#ii. This report 
stated physicians are increasingly unable to keep abreast of the ever-expanding 
knowledge bases related to health. There are massive amounts of new literature 
from clinical trials each year. Furthermore, the studies may be biased or inapplica-
ble to key sub-groups of target populations, resulting in quality concerns. With 
this, obtaining and applying CPGs is important because CPGs “embody and sup-
port the interrelationships among critical contributors to clinical decision making”. 
CPGs can avoid a “one-size-fits-all” approach by enhancing clinician and patient 
decision-making, scientific evidence and reasoning behind clinical recommenda-
tions easily accessible and relevant to a specific patient-encounter. CPGs can po-
tentially enhance the quality of healthcare by effectively translating complex scien-
tific research findings into recommendations for clinical practice.     
Updated Definition of CPG: “Clinical practice guidelines are statements that in-
clude recommendations intended to optimize patient care that are informed by a 
systematic review of evidence and an assessment of the benefits and harms of al-
ternative care options.” The report goes on, describing a number of recommenda-
tions, mostly regarding how to develop trustworthy guidelines. 
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The American College of Cardiology and the American 
Heart Association Clinical Practice Guidelines 
 The American College of Cardiology and the American Heart 
Association have formally agreed with the Institute of Medicine in its 
recommendations in developing clinical practice guidelines.40 In 2008, 
these two groups, in association with the Heart Rhythm Society, de-
veloped “Guidelines for Device-Based Therapy of Cardiac Rhythm 
Abnormalities,” which include considerations for addressing terminal 
care.41 
                                                                                                                             
 40. Amy Murphy, American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association 
Media Comment: Institute of Medicine Makes Recommendations on Producing Trustwor-
thy Guidelines, AM. C. OF CARDIOLOGY (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.acc.org/about-
acc/press-releases/2011/03/29/10/04/institute-of-medicine-makes-recommen 
dations-on-producing-trustworthy-guidelines. 
 41. Andrew E. Epstein et al., ACC/AHA/HRS 2008 Guidelines for Device-Based 
Therapy of Cardiac Rhythm Abnormalities, 51 J. OF THE AM. C. OF CARDIOLOGY 2085, 
2085-2105 (May 2008). This is a revision of the “ACC/AHA/NASPE Guidelines for 
Implantation of Cardiac Pacemakers and Antiarrhythmia Devices which updates 
the previous versions written in 1984, 1991, 1998, and 2002. “3.4.4 Terminal Care: 
In the United States, the withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments 
(e.g., cardiopulmonary resuscitation, mechanical ventilation, or hemodialysis) 
from terminally ill patients who do not want the treatments is ethical and legal. 
Honoring these requests is an integral aspect of patient-centered care and should 
not be regarded as physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia. 
When terminally ill patients (or their surrogates) request pacemaker, ICD, or CRT 
deactivation, questions related to the ethics of device deactivation may arise. Ques-
tions commonly asked include: Are implantable devices life-sustaining treat-
ments? Is deactivation the same as physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia? Is de-
activation ethical? Is it legal? Under what conditions (e.g., code status) should 
deactivation be performed? Who should carry out deactivation? What documenta-
tion should exist? The prevalence of implantable devices in patients dying of non-
cardiac diseases makes this an increasingly encountered clinical issue. Patients and 
families fear that devices will prolong the dying process, and some dying patients 
with ICDs fear uncomfortable defibrillations. In fact, investigators have found that 
some patients with ICDs experience uncomfortable defibrillations throughout the 
dying process, including moments before death.  
Physicians do not usually talk about it: Cardiologists who implant devices do not 
commonly have discussions with patients about end-of-life issues and device deac-
tivation. Furthermore, published experience with deactivation of devices is lim-
ited. Distinction between deactivating ICD and PM: There is general consensus 
regarding the ethical and legal permissibility of deactivating ICDs in dying pa-
tients who request deactivation. However, caregivers involved in device manage-
ment generally make a distinction between deactivating a pacemaker and deac-
tivating an ICD or CRT device. All are “medical treatments”: Given the clinical 
context, all three can be considered life-sustaining treatments. (ICD, PM, CRTs= 
“all three”) Patients may “refuse” all three: Notably, patients may refuse all of 
these devices, and to impose them on patients who do not want them is unethical 
and illegal (battery).  
No ethical/legal distinction between withhold/withdraw: Furthermore, ethics and 
law make no distinction between withholding and withdrawing treatments. 
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 There is a 2012 update, but the update does not change section 
3.4.4. Terminal Care.42 The patient about whom this article is written 
does not consider himself as terminal, and whether or not a patient is 
considered “terminal” may or may not be an issue. The Heart Rhythm 
Society Expert Consensus Statement does directly address the Man-
agement of Cardiovascular Implantable Electronic Devices (CIEDs) in 
patients nearing end of life or requesting withdrawal of therapy, de-
veloped in collaboration and endorsed by the American College of 
Cardiology (ACC), the American Geriatrics Society (AGS), the Ameri-
can Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine (AAHPM), the 
American Heart Association (AHA), the European Heart Rhythm As-
sociation (EHRA), and the Hospice and Palliative Nurses Association 
(HPNA).43 
 The patient about whom this article is written cited the HRS 
Expert Consensus Statement in his request to the Army to provide 
him an answer to his question about deactivation of his pacemaker. 
The Army never directly addressed this document, which appears to 
support this patient’s autonomy, self-determination and his constitu-
tional right to accept or to refuse unwanted medical treatment. 
Highlights of the Heart Rhythm Society Expert 
Consensus Statement 
 The expert consensus statement needs no translation. Below 
are highlights taken from the statement and arranged and concentrat-
ed in bullet points. 
                                                                                                                             
Recommendation of approach to take with dying patients who request deactiva-
tion:  
Informing BEFORE implantation: Clinicians involved in device education at the 
time of implantation may need to provide more comprehensive information with 
regard to end-of-life issues. For example, clinicians should encourage patients un-
dergoing device implantation to complete advanced directives and specifically 
address the matter of device management and deactivation if the patient is termi-
nally ill. 
 42. Cynthia M. Tracy, 2012 ACCF/AHA/HRS Focused Update of the 2008 Guide-
lines for Device-Based Therapy of Cardiac Rhythm Abnormalities, 60 J. OF THE AM. COL. 
OF CARDIOLOGY e7, e7-e85 (Oct. 2012). These focused updates do not seem to alter 
any of the areas relating to medical/ethical/legal issues surrounding deactivation.  
 43. See Lampert, supra note 1. Cardiac Implantable Electronic Devices (CIEDs) 
include all pacemakers, ICDs, and CRT devices and have grown in popularity over 
the years. Every patient with a CIED will eventually reach the end of their life, 
whether it is due to the underlying cardiac condition or from developing another 
disease. 
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• Basic principles: a patient with decision-making capacity always 
has the legal right to refuse or request the withdrawal of any 
medical treatment or intervention. When a patient lacks ca-
pacity, the patient’s legal guardian has the right to refuse or 
request the withdrawal of treatment, based on what the pa-
tient would have chosen, if they had capacity.44 
• The definition of a life-sustaining treatment is an intervention 
provided and managed by a clinician that prolongs life but 
does not necessarily reverse the underlying disease. Ethically 
and legally, there is no difference between refusing CIED 
therapy and requesting withdrawal of CIED therapy. The 
right to refuse or discontinue treatment is a personal right of 
the patient and does not depend on the characteristics of the 
particular treatment involved. Common examples include 
hemodialysis, ventilation, and artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion but most clinicians who work with CIEDs consider 
pacemakers and ICDs life-sustaining treatments as well.45 
• There are four prima facia principles regarding most medical-
ethics concerns: respect for patient autonomy (duty to respect 
patients and their rights to self-determination), beneficence 
(duty to promote patient interests), non-maleficence (the duty 
to prevent harm to patients), and justice (the duty to treat pa-
tients and distribute health care resources fairly). Carrying out 
a request to withdraw medical treatment, specifically CIED 
therapy, is neither physicians-assisted suicide nor euthanasia. 
The panel also suggests that advance directives should be en-
couraged for all patients with CIEDs.46 
• A physician cannot be forced to carry out an ethically- and legal-
ly-permitted procedure if it goes against the physician’s per-
sonal values. However, nor can the clinician abandon the pa-
tient. Instead, the clinician must make a reasonable effort to 
help the patient find a physician who will comply with their 
wishes.47 
• Informed consent is a crucial aspect of the patient-doctor rela-
tionship and derives from the ethical principle of respecting 
persons. Personal autonomy is furthered when patients un-
                                                                                                                             
 44. Id. at 1009. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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derstand the nature of their diagnosis and procedures and 
participate in the decision-making process of their health care. 
The elements of informed consent include information, pa-
tient voluntariness, and patient decision-making capacity.48 
Clinicians are legally and ethically required to provide suffi-
cient informed consent to allow their patients to participate in 
decision-making regarding treatment options. One of these 
options must be no treatment at all or refusal of treatment. 
The corollary to informed consent is informed refusal. Pa-
tients have the right to refuse any medical treatment, includ-
ing those that prolong life. Furthermore, a patient has the 
right to refuse a previously consented treatment if the treat-
ment no longer meets the patient’s health care goals.49 
• A patient has the right to refuse or request the withdrawal of 
CIED therapies regardless of whether he or she is terminally 
ill or not, and regardless of whether the therapies prolong life, 
and hence, death would follow as a consequence of a decision 
not to use them. Two main factors differentiate discontinuing 
an unwanted treatment and physician-assisted suicide or eu-
thanasia: the intent of the clinician and the cause of death. The 
intent of the physician in withdrawing or withholding any 
medical treatment, including CIED therapy, is to discontinue 
an unwanted treatment that the patient considers a burden 
and allow the underlying condition to run its course. The 
physician’s intent is not to cause the patient’s death. With as-
sisted suicide, however, the patient intentionally terminates 
his or her life using medication a physician prescribed for that 
purpose. However, when an unwanted life-sustaining treat-
ment is deactivated, an underlying medical-condition ulti-
mately causes death.50 
• Advance directives promote personal autonomy and lessen the 
possible ethical dilemma suffered by clinicians and surrogates 
should they decide to deactivate a patient’s pacemaker.51 
• Any facility that implants CIEDs should have a clearly defined 
process to withdraw therapies when necessary. Deactivation 
                                                                                                                             
 48. See Jessica DeBord, Informed Consent (Mar. 7, 2014), http://depts. 
washington.edu/bioethx/topics/consent.html. 
 49. Lampert, supra note 1, at 1010. 
 50. Id. at 1011. 
 51. Id. at 1013. 
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of CIED therapies requires an order from the attending physi-
cian, along with proper documentation. The documentation 
must include a physician-determination of capacity or recog-
nition of an appropriate surrogate, record of a discussion re-
garding potential consequences of deactivation, and of possi-
ble alternatives. The orders must include exactly what proce-
procedure will be done.52 
• Deactivation should be performed by physicians, device-clinic 
nurses, or technologists with electrophysiology expertise. Pac-
ing therapies may be “withdrawn” by programming them to 
specific modes. If those modes are unavailable, it is possible to 
set the device to pace slow enough to render it essentially 
non-functional. Deactivating ICDs is more common and can 
be accomplished by placing a magnet over the device for a 
certain amount of time. Deactivation can occur in different 
settings, most typically in an acute-care hospital, patient facili-
ty, or in a patient’s home.53 
End of Life Decision-Making and Deactivation of 
Pacemakers 
 Bolstered by the ACC/AHA Clinical Practice Guidelines and 
strengthened by the HRS Expert Consensus Statement, the authority for 
making the decision to deactivate a pacemaker still revolves around the 
concepts of informed consent and a person’s constitutional right to ac-
cept or refuse unwanted treatment, including life-sustaining treatment.54  
 In general and with few exceptions, an individual with decision-
making capacity has the right to consent to or refuse any suggested 
medical treatment, even if refusal may result in death.55 
 It has been forty years since the landmark case In re Quinlan,56 
in which the New Jersey courts faced the issue of removing life-
                                                                                                                             
 52. Id. at 1019. 
 53. Id. at 1020-21. 
 54. See generally H. Hosmer-Cernava, Ethics: Deactivating a Cardiac Pacemaker: 




 55. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend XIV; Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 
U.S. 261 (1990) (assuming, and strongly suggesting, that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesav-
ing medical treatment). 
 56. In re Quinlan, 355 A. 2d 647, 651 (N.J. 1976).  
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sustaining treatment, namely a respirator, from a comatose patient. 
Since then, courts have been faced with other heart-breaking cases in-
volving decisions at the end of life and often the cases involve techno-
logical advances which can keep a body alive artificially.57 Some cases 
have been highly publicized and often the courts have relied on basic 
informed consent principles to make their decisions.58 For this article, 
the question arises—“Why is the deactivation of a pacemaker differ-
ent than removal of a respirator?” 
 In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that, pursuant 
to her guardian’s (her father) request, life-sustaining treatment could 
be removed from Karen Ann Quinlan, a comatose patient who was in 
a persistent vegetative state.59 The court based its decision primarily 
on Karen Ann Quinlan’s constitutional right to privacy as well as to 
her right to self-determination.60 In its decision, the court also ad-
dressed several issues relating to informed consent, including the con-
cept of informed refusal of treatment and stated, “…it is the constitu-
tional right of privacy that has given us the most concern.”61 The court 
concluded that if Karen were “miraculously lucid for an interval . . . 
and perceptive of her irreversible condition, she could effectively de-
cide upon discontinuance of the life-support apparatus, even if it 
meant the prospect of natural death.”62 
Ten years later, in Bouvia v. Superior Court, the California Su-
preme Court held that Elizabeth Bouvia was a mentally competent pa-
tient who understood the risks of refusal of life sustaining treatment 
by means of artificial nutrition and hydration and, using basic in-
formed consent principles, found that Ms. Bouvia had the right to re-
fuse treatment and that the State’s interest in preserving her life did 
not outweigh her right to refuse.63 
 A few years later, a Hawaii Circuit Court found that individuals 
have an independent, constitutional right to privacy under Article 1, 
Section 6 of the Hawaii Constitution and that this right would allow a 
person, or a guardian acting on behalf of an incompetent person (us-
                                                                                                                             
 57. See generally Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261; In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 916 So. 
2d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
 58. Id. 
 59. In re Quinlan, 355 A. 2d at 651. 
 60. Id. at 662. As a result, “removal of a respirator is [now] routinely per-
formed without judicial intervention.” Note, The Current State of Termination of 
Medical Treatment Case Law, 9 NOVA L. J. 159, 159 (1984). 
 61. In re Quinlan, 355 A. 2d at 662.  
 62. Id. at 663. 
 63. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Ct. App. 297 (1986). 
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ing “substituted judgment”), the right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment, including artificially provided nutrition and hydration, if 
done consistent with accepted medical practice.64 
 The seminal case regarding withdrawal of unwanted medical 
treatment was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Missouri Department of Health.65 In this case, the guardians of a pa-
tient in a vegetative state sought to terminate the artificial nutrition 
and hydration that was keeping her alive, but the hospital employees 
refused to do so without a court order.66 The District Court granted the 
request to terminate treatment, and the Missouri Supreme Court re-
versed.67 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri 
Supreme Court decision, ruling that the evidence produced at trial 
was not clear and convincing proof of Nancy Cruzan’s wish to have 
hydration and nutrition withdrawn.68 However, the Court also recog-
nized that there exists a protected liberty interest in refusing medical 
treatment based on prior decisions regarding invasions into the body 
and that the forced administration of life-sustaining medical treat-
ment, and even of artificially-delivered food and water essential to 
life, might implicate a competent person’s liberty interest.69 The Court 
went on to state, “for purposes of this case, we assume that the United 
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally 
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”70 In her 
concurrence, Justice O’Connor noted that receiving nutrition and hy-
dration via gastronomy or jejunostomy tubes is just as invasive as oth-
er types of medical treatment and “[r]equiring a competent adult to 
endure such procedures against her will burdens the patient’s liberty, 
dignity, and freedom to determine the course of her own treatment.”71 
The Court held that there are situations where the State may de-
cline to make decisions about the “quality of life” but instead assert-
ing an “unqualified interest in the preservation of human life, to be 
weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of the indi-
vidual.”72 However, the facts in that case are different from the facts 
                                                                                                                             
 64. In re Guardianship of Crabtree, No. 86-0031 (Hawaii Fam. Ct. 1st Cir. Apr. 
26, 1990) (Heeley, J.). 
 65. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.  
 66. Id. at 268. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 263. 
 69. Id. at 278.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 289. 
 72. Id. at 280. 
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presented by the patient who is the subject of this article. He is a men-
tally capacitated adult who is seeking deactivation of his CIED. In 
Cruzan, the court was presented with issues surrounding a patient 
who was incapacitated.73 
 Except, as will be discussed later in this article, with respect to a 
desire to commit suicide or for a health care provider to cause a per-
son to become dead, the patient’s particular reasons or intent do not 
seem to be factors in these articulated protections. It also seems clear 
that the patient, while capacitated, could also project instructions and 
express desires for further treatment or refusal of treatment. 
The Patient Self-Determination Act 
 Passage of the Patient Self-Determination Act74 (PSDA) in 1990, es-
tablished the right of all patients with decision-making capacity to state 
their treatment preferences in advance, and the related responsibilities of 
health care organizations. The PSDA requires organizations to do five 
things: 
1. Provide written information to patients at the time of admission 
or initial provision of services concerning patients’ rights under 
state law to make decisions about what medical care they want or 
do not want including a patient’s right to accept or refuse life-
sustaining or life-prolonging medical treatment. 
2. Maintain written policies and procedures regarding advance 
directives and provide written information to patients about what 
those policies are. 
3. Document in the patient’s medical records whether he or she 
has executed advance directives. 
4. Ensure compliance with state law at each health care organiza-
tion which is subject to the federal law. 
5. Provide information for the education of the staff and commu-
nity on issues concerning advance directives.
75 
This federal law has been used as a basic foundation for state legis-
latures, health care regulating agencies, health care providers, consumer 
advocates and federal entities to promote patient rights.76 While the 
PSDA applies only to those health care organizations that participate in 
                                                                                                                             
 73. Id. at 266. 
 74. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub.Law 101-508, §§ 4206, 
4751 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc, 1396a (2012)). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Law for Older Americans, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/public_education/resources/law_issues_for_consumers/patient_self_det
ermination_act.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2017). 
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Medicare and Medicaid, it provides the model and context for federal 
policy on advance care planning.77 The intent of this law is to help indi-
viduals understand that they have strong rights regarding their medical 
treatment and to help them exercise those rights if they wish.78 The intent 
of this law also is to help avoid problems and litigation over the initia-
tion or continuation of unwanted life-prolonging medical treatment.79 
“An advance directive can be used to document a person’s wishes in 
advance of incapacity and can be used to provide clear and convincing 
evidence of how treatment should proceed.”80 
 The federal law also prohibits the health care organization from 
conditioning the provision of care or otherwise discriminating against 
patients based on whether or not advance directives have been execut-
ed.81 “The PSDA strengthened the effect of codified legal options of indi-
viduals wanting to avoid the dilemma confronted by Nancy Cruzan and 
her family. These options are called advance directives. . . . [Thus,] each 
state establishe[d] its own criteria for making advance directives orally 
or through documents such as the living will . . . .”82 
                                                                                                                             
 77. See, e.g., DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., Advance Care Planning and Management 
of Advance Directives, (Dec. 24, 2013), https://www.va.gov/vhapublications/ 
View/Publications.asp?pub_ID=2967. The military health system (MHS) has fol-
lowed the provisions of the Patient Self Determination Act for many years. This 
was not because the MHS was required to comply by statute; it was not. Until the 
institution of TRICARE for Life, the MRS was prohibited from accepting either 
Medicare or Medicaid funds, the trigger for requiring compliance. Compliance 
with the provisions of the Patient Self Determination Act is the result of the De-
fense Department’s requirement for medical treatment facilities to be accredited by 
the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO), 
hereafter referred to as the Joint Commission. The Department of Defense (DoD) 
requires “all fixed hospitals and free-standing ambulatory clinics, including those 
providing care to DoD beneficiaries under various managed care support con-
tracts” to be accredited by the Joint Commission.  
 78. What is Patient Self-Determination Act?, LEGAL HELPMATE, http:// 
www.legalhelpmate.com/health-care-directive-patient-act.aspx (last visited Mar. 
30, 2017). 
 79. Id. 
 80. KATHRYN BRAUN ET AL., CULTURAL ISSUES IN END-OF-LIFE DECISION 
MAKING 40 (Kathryn L. Braun et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter BRAUN]. 
 81. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 § 4206 (2)(c). 
 82. BRAUN, supra note 80, at 42. Although a written advance directive is desir-
able, some states do not mandate written declarations. For example, in Hawaii a 
verbal statement made by the patient to a physician or even perhaps to a friend or 
relative of the patient may be considered in deciding whether the patient would 
want life-sustaining procedures to be withdrawn or withheld. Unambiguous ver-
bal statement by the patient or reliable reports thereof, are to be documented in the 
patient’s medical record. As in many states, Hawaii’s law provides that, in the ab-
sence of any declaration at all (written or verbal) ordinary standards of current 
medical practice will be followed.  
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Overview of Health Care Decision Making In Hawaii 
 The patient who is the subject of this article lives in Hawaii, 
and the Army health care facility, which provides his cardiac care, is 
in Hawaii. 
 Hawaii’s Constitution incorporates an explicit privacy provi-
sion, which states, “[t]he right of the people to privacy is recognized 
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state 
interest.”83 This section guarantees a right to privacy that protects an 
individual’s interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and in 
freely making certain important personal decisions.84 In the context of 
health care decision-making, this provision has been cited as a basis 
for upholding the right of a person (or a guardian for an incompetent 
person) to refuse unwanted medical treatment.85 
 Over two decades ago, Hawaii adopted a strong public policy 
in favor of a person’s right to accept or refuse medical treatment.86 
This seminal law provided that “all competent persons have the fun-
damental right to control the decisions relating to their own medical 
care, including the decision to have medical or surgical means or pro-
cedures calculated to prolong their lives provided, continued, with-
held or withdrawn. The artificial prolongation of life for persons with 
a terminal condition or a permanent loss of ability to communicate 
concerning medical treatment decisions, may secure only a precarious 
and burdensome existence, while providing nothing medically neces-
sary or beneficial to the person.”87 
 Hawaii has a number of laws that help to assure health care 
providers will carry out a patient’s wishes, including an intention to 
withdraw or withhold treatment and alleviate undue suffering.88 
Health care is defined broadly under Hawaii law89 and can be read to 
                                                                                                                             
 83. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
 84. See, e.g., Doe v. City and County of Honolulu, 816 P.2d 306 (Haw. Ct. App. 
1991). 
 85. In re Guardianship of Crabtree, No.86-0031 (Haw. Fam. Ct., 1st Cir. April 
26, 1990). 
 86. Medical Treatment Decisions (repealed 1999), HAW. REV. STAT. CH. 327D 
(First enacted in 1986, amended periodically and subsequently repealed, effective 
July 1, 1999). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-3 (1999) (“Health-care” means any care, treatment, 
service, or procedure to maintain, diagnose, or otherwise affect an individual's 
physical or mental condition, including: 
   (1) Selection and discharge of health-care providers and institutions; 
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include providers of medicine, surgery, psychiatry, dentistry and oth-
er health care practices affecting an individual’s physical or mental 
condition.90 
Informed Consent 
 As in other jurisdictions, health care decisions are made every 
day in Hawaii by patients or their authorized representatives, along 
with their physicians or other health care providers. Over the years, it 
has become increasingly important to address not only what health 
care an individual wants, but also how decisions are made and en-
forced when the patient is unable personally to make informed deci-
sions. As in other states, a combination of laws impact health care de-
cision-making in Hawaii. 
 Across the country, the process for making medical treatment de-
cisions revolves around the concepts of informed consent and a person’s 
constitutional right to accept or to refuse unwanted medical treatment. 
In general, and with few exceptions, the United States Constitution and 
the common law provide that an individual with decision-making ca-
pacity has the right to consent to or refuse any suggested medical 
treatment, even if refusal may result in death.91 Hawaii, like the other 
states, has treated this issue with relative consistency.92 
 To ensure that the patient’s consent to treatment is informed, the 
State of Hawaii legislature has provided the Board of Medical Examiners 
the option, within certain boundaries, to establish standards for health 
care providers to follow in giving information to a patient, or to a pa-
tient’s guardian or “surrogate” if the patient is not competent.93 These 
                                                                                                                             
   (2) Approval or disapproval of diagnostic tests, surgical procedures, programs of 
medication, and orders not to resuscitate; and 
   (3) Direction to provide, withhold, or withdraw artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion; provided that withholding or withdrawing artificial nutrition or hydration is 
in accord with generally accepted health-care standards applicable to health-care 
providers or institutions. 
   “Health-care decision” means a decision made by an individual or the individu-
al's agent, guardian, or surrogate, regarding the individual's health care.”). 
 90. Id. “Health-care provider” means an individual licensed, certified, or oth-
erwise authorized or permitted by law to provide health care in the ordinary 
course of business or practice of a profession. 
 91. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270.  
 92. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 671-3 (1983). 
 93. See id. (On January 1, 2004, Hawaii Laws Act 114 (H.B. 651) (2003) became 
effective. The Act amends section 671-3 substantially by recognizing “legal surro-
gates” for the purposes of making health-care decisions. For the purposes of the Act, a 
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standards may include the substantive content of the information to be 
given, the manner in which the information is to be given by the health 
care provider, and the manner in which consent is to be given by the pa-
tient or guardian.94 The concept of informed consent continues to evolve, 
but essentially, it revolves around a patient’s right to have the oppor-
tunity to be an informed participant in his or her healthcare deci-
sions.95 Discussions regarding the treatment or procedures normally 
include information regarding the patient’s diagnosis, the nature and 
purpose of a proposed treatment or procedure, their attendant risks 
and benefits, alternative treatments or procedures and their attendant 
risks and benefits and the risks and benefits of not receiving or under-
going a treatment or procedure.96 
 The doctrine of informed consent to treatment includes the 
right to informed refusal of treatment. A competent adult patient has 
the right to refuse all forms of health care intervention, including life-
saving or life-prolonging treatment.97 
 Hawaii has adopted a patient-oriented standard applicable to 
the duty to disclose risk information prior to treatment.98 The patient-
oriented standard of informed consent focuses on what reasonable pa-
tients objectively need to hear from the health care provider to allow 
them to make informed and intelligent decisions regarding proposed 
medical treatment.99 Questions about failure to provide informed con-
sent, e.g., by an Army Medical Center, that once a pacemaker is im-
planted may implicate a failure to provide adequate informed consent 
and thus make the Army susceptible to claims of medical malprac-
                                                                                                                             
“legal surrogate” is “an agent designated in a power of attorney for health care or a 
surrogate designated or selected in accordance with Chapter 327E.”). 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. H.B. 651, 2003 Leg., 23rd Sess. (Haw. 2003); S.B. 624, 2003 Leg., 23rd Sess. 
(Haw. 2003). These statutes were introduced in the 2003 legislative session to up-
date Hawaii’s informed consent laws. A compromise bill was passed and signed 
into law as Act 114. In brief, the changes to the law, effective January 2004, includ-
ed changes to update Hawaii law to make it more consistent with other laws and 
extending the right to consent to or refuse medical treatment to legal guardians or 
surrogates.  
 97. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79 (assuming, and strongly suggesting, that 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to 
refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment). 
 98. Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489, 498 (Haw. 1995). 
 99. Id. at 499. This case overruled the prior standard as expressed in Nishi v. 
Hartwell, 473 P.2d 116 (Haw. 1970). 
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tice100 under the Federal Tort Claims Act,101 which will be discussed at 
the end of this article. 
Hawaii’s Uniform Health Care Decisions Act (Modified) 
 For the most part, Hawaii’s Uniform Health Care Decisions Act 
(Modified) or UHCDA follows a model act developed by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), but 
has a few provisions that are unique to Hawaii.102 The UHCDA takes a 
comprehensive approach by placing the so-called “living will,”103 the 
durable power of attorney for health care, a “family consent” or sur-
rogate law, and general provisions regarding health care and health 
care decisions together in one statute. The new “individual instruc-
tion,” which takes the place of what is commonly called the “living 
will,” applies to a wide range of health care decisions, not just end-of-
life decisions.104 The residual decision-making portion of the Act is 
somewhat like family consent statutes that have been adopted in a 
majority of states.105 This section of the Act applies only if there is no 
applicable individual instruction, guardian, or appointed agent.106 
Hawaii has established a unique framework for appointing or select-
ing surrogates.107 In Hawaii, there is no established hierarchy for sur-
rogates.108 
 Under Hawaii’s version of the UHCDA, an adult or emanci-
pated minor may make advance health care directives109 by giving an 
“individual instruction”110 orally or in writing and/or by executing a 
power of attorney for health care, which may authorize the agent to 
make any health care decision the principal could have made while 
                                                                                                                             
 100. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 671-3 (1983) is included in Chapter 671 Medical 
Torts. HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-1 (a) (“‘Medical tort’ means professional negligence, 
the rendering of professional service without informed consent, or an error or 
omission in professional practice, by a health care provider, which proximately 
causes death, injury or other damage to a patient.”). 
 101. 28 USC § 2674 (2016). 
 102. See generally JAMES H. PIETSCH & LENORA H. LEE, THE ELDER LAW HAWAI’I 
HANDBOOK (1998) [hereinafter PIETSCH].  
 103. Nowhere in the statute is the term “living will” used. 
 104. See generally PIETSCH, supra note 102. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-3 (1999). 
 110. Id. (defining an “Individual Instruction” as an individual’s direction con-
cerning a health care decision for the individual). 
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having capacity. An individual may revoke the designation of an 
agent only by a signed writing or by personally informing the super-
vising health care provider,111 but an individual may revoke all or part 
of an advance health care directive, other than the designation of an 
agent, at any time and in any manner that communicates an intent to 
revoke.112 The law even provides an optional sample form (and expla-
nation), which may be duplicated or modified to suit the needs of the 
person.113 Alternately, one may use a completely different form that 
contains the substance of the sample form found in the statute.114 
 For purposes of this article, if a patient requests that a pace-
maker (or other internally placed cardiac device such as an implanta-
ble cardioverter-defibrillator (ICD)) be deactivated, the patient should 
include such directions in an advance directive (as well as in Comfort 
Care Only-Do-Not-Resuscitate and Provider Orders for Life-
Sustaining Treatment-POLST), as will be discussed.115 
 Under the UHCDA, a surrogate may make a health care deci-
sion for a patient if the patient lacks capacity and no agent or guardi-
an has been appointed or neither the agent nor guardian is available.116 
A patient may designate or disqualify any individual to act as a sur-
rogate by personally informing the supervising health care provider.117 
In the absence of such a designation, or if the designee is not reasona-
bly available, a surrogate may be appointed to make a health care de-
cision for the patient.118 Unlike the Uniform Act approved by the 
NCCUSL, Hawaii’s modified version of the UHCDA does not provide 
for the more common approach of a hierarchy of decision-makers for 
a decisionally incapacitated patient, but instead provides for decision-
making by surrogates selected from a group of “interested persons.”119 
                                                                                                                             
 111. Id. § 327E-4(a). 
 112. Id. § 327E-4(b). 
 113. Id. § 327E-16. 
 114. Id.  
 115. For example, “I want my Pacemaker turned off or deactivated if: 
• I have a Do-Not-Resuscitate or Comfort Care Only Order; or 
• I have an incurable illness or injury and am dying; or 
• I am admitted to Hospice (e.g., inpatient or home) 
unless my physician believes deactivation would cause further burden or suffer-
ing.” 
 116. Id. § 327E-2 (defines “capacity” as an individual’s ability to understand the 
significant benefits, risks, and alternatives to proposed health care and to make 
and communicate a health-care decision). 
 117. Id. § 327E-5(a). 
 118. Id. § 327E-5(b). 
 119. Id. 
PIETSCH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/15/2017 9:52 AM 
NUMBER 1                  LAW IN DEACTIVATION OF ICDS  33 
 Under the Hawaii statute, “interested persons” means the pa-
tient’s spouse (unless legally separated or estranged), a reciprocal 
beneficiary, any adult child, either parent of the patient, an adult sib-
ling or adult grandchild of the patient, or any adult who has exhibited 
special care and concern for the patient and who is familiar with the 
patient’s personal values.120 As explained above, the patient can desig-
nate or disqualify a surrogate. Accordingly, interested persons can be 
“trumped” by an orally designated surrogate.121 In the same manner, a 
patient may orally disqualify someone who otherwise might be enti-
tled to make decisions on behalf of the patient.122 
 Hawaii’s version of the UHCDA places restrictions on deci-
sions by “non-designated surrogates.”123 For example, the statute pro-
vides that “artificial nutrition and hydration may be withheld or 
withdrawn upon a decision by the surrogate only when the primary 
physician and a second independent physician certify in the patient’s 
medical records that the provision of artificial nutrition or hydration is 
merely prolonging the act of dying and that the patient is highly un-
likely to have any neurological response in the future.”124 Neither phy-
sician-assisted suicide nor physician-assisted death is addressed in the 
surrogate section of the statute.125 
 Hawaii’s statute follows the UHCDA, for the most part, in 
dealing with decisions by guardians, obligations of health-care pro-
viders, health care information, immunities, statutory damages, judi-
cial relief, uniformity of application, and other administrative mat-
ters.126 The provisions relating to obligations of health-care providers 
are especially important to the issues addressed in this article in that 
there is a general obligation to “[c]omply with an individual instruc-
tion of the patient and with a reasonable interpretation of that instruc-
tion made by a person then authorized to make health-care decisions 
                                                                                                                             
 120. Id. § 327E-2. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. § 327E-5 (e) (mentions a “surrogate who has not been designated”). 
 124. Id. This particular provision has been the source of some confusion. There 
are several unanswered questions. Does “any neurological response” equate to 
something less than brain death and if so, what? Must tube feeding be applied or 
continued for every patient who has a “non-designated” surrogate selected to 
make health-care decisions if no definition of “any neurological response” can be 
agreed on by the medical community? Would seeking guardianship rather than 
selecting a “non-designated” surrogate be an effective means of circumventing the 
limitations? 
 125. Id. § 327E-5. 
 126. Id. § 327E-1. 
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for the patient.”127 In Hawaii, a health-care provider may decline to 
comply with an individual instruction or health-care decision for rea-
sons of conscience.128 A health-care institution may decline to comply 
with an individual instruction or health-care decision if the instruction 
or decision is contrary to a policy of the institution, which is expressly 
based on reasons of conscience and if the policy was timely communi-
cated to the patient or to a person then authorized to make health-care 
decisions for the patient.129 The institution involved in this article’s 
case does not appear to have discussed any pacemaker deactivation 
policy with the patient. 
 Advance health-care directives under the UHCDA can be use-
ful in providing instructions for deactivation, but these directives may 
not be very useful when a patient suffers cardiac or respiratory ar-
rest.130 In a hospital or other health-care facility setting, a patient who 
suffers an arrest is routinely resuscitated unless there is a written do-
not-resuscitate order in the medical record.131 The DNR order is only 
                                                                                                                             
 127. Id. § 327E-7. Obligations of health-care provider.  
(d) Except as provided in subsections (e) and (f), a health-care provider or institu-
tion providing care to a patient shall: 
   (1) Comply with an individual instruction of the patient and with a reasonable 
interpretation of that instruction made by a person then authorized to make 
health-care decisions for the patient; and 
   (2) Comply with a health-care decision for the patient made by a person then au-
thorized to make health-care decisions for the patient to the same extent as if the 
decision had been made by the patient while having capacity. 
   (e) A health-care provider may decline to comply with an individual instruction 
or health-care decision for reasons of conscience. A health-care institution may de-
cline to comply with an individual instruction or health-care decision if the in-
struction or decision is contrary to a policy of the institution which is expressly 
based on reasons of conscience and if the policy was timely communicated to the 
patient or to a person then authorized to make health-care decisions for the pa-
tient. 
   (f) A health-care provider or institution may decline to comply with an individu-
al instruction or health-care decision that requires medically ineffective health care 
or health care contrary to generally accepted health-care standards applicable to 
the health-care provider or institution. 
   (g) A health-care provider or institution that declines to comply with an individ-
ual instruction or health-care decision shall: 
   (1) Promptly so inform the patient, if possible, and any person then authorized to 
make health-care decisions for the patient; 
   (2) Provide continuing care to the patient until a transfer can be effected; and 
   (3) Unless the patient or person then authorized to make health-care decisions 
for the patient refuses assistance, immediately make all reasonable efforts to assist 
in the transfer of the patient to another health-care provider or institution that is 
willing to comply with the instruction or decision. 
 128. Id. § 327E-7(e). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. § 321-23.6(a)(1). 
 131. See id. 
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an instruction to withhold the otherwise automatic initiation of cardi-
opulmonary resuscitation, and it should not affect other forms of 
treatment.132 Outside of a health-care facility, emergency response per-
sonnel normally attempt to resuscitate an individual who suffers a 
cardiac or respiratory arrest.133 This may or may not be the course of 
action that the individual would request if he or she still could make 
and express a choice. Since 1995, Hawaii law has provided for so-
called out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate protocols.134 
Comfort Care Only-Do-Not-Resuscitate 
 Under a 2006 statute that modified the 1995 law,135 the Depart-
ment of Health was to adopt new rules for emergency medical ser-
vices, which include uniform methods of rapidly identifying an adult 
person who has certified, or for whom has been certified, in a written 
“comfort care only” document that the person (or, consistent with the 
UHCDA, the person’s guardian, agent, or surrogate) directs emergen-
cy medical services personnel, first responder personnel, and 
healthcare providers not to administer chest compressions, rescue 
breathing, electric shocks, or medication, or all of these, given to re-
start the heart if the person’s breathing or heart stops, and directs that 
the person is to receive care for comfort only, including oxygen, air-
way suctioning, splinting of fractures, pain medicine, and other 
measures required for comfort.136 As of the date this chapter was writ-
ten, no rules have been adopted but practical information has been 
provided by the Hawaii Department of Health.137 
                                                                                                                             
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 321-23.6 (2006) (Rapid identification docu-
ments). 
 135. Act 46 was signed into law amending HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-23.6 on Apr. 
27, 2006; see H.B. 3126, 23rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (2006) (enacted).  
 136. For specific requirements for the written document containing the certifi-
cation, see HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-23.6 (2006). Several other states have addressed 
the issue of out-of-hospital DNRs and, while Hawaii has taken a unique approach 
to its statute, several states have similar documents to identify patients who do not 
want CPR. The documents have varying names but several are called “Physician 
Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment” or POLST. See also Robert C. Anderson, 
Physician Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment (POLST): Breathing New Life Into End-
of-Life Care Planning, 259 ELDER L. ADVISORY 1 (2012).  
 137. See Comfort Care Only: Do Not Resuscitate Information, STATE OF HAWAII, 
DEP’T OF HEALTH EM. MED. SERVS. (2017), http://health.hawaii.gov/ems/ 
home/comfort-care-only-do-not-resuscitate-information/ (last visited Mar. 30, 
2017) [hereinafter Comfort Care Only]. 
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Provider Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment  
 In 2009, the Hawaii Legislature passed a law providing for a 
health care protocol called Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining 
Treatment (“POLST”).138 This law was modified in 2014 to include ad-
vance practice registered nurses.139 The POLST form contains infor-
mation and directions about an individual’s end-of-life decisions, such 
as cardiopulmonary resuscitation (“CPR”) and tube feeding, that 
emergency medical personnel and other health care professionals are 
required to follow.140 By law, the POLST form is not an advance di-
rective but a physician or advanced practice registered nurse’s order 
and, accordingly, is immediately actionable.141 
 Even though it is not an advance directive, the most frequent 
use of the POLST form is as a summary of an individual’s advance di-
rective decisions and information about life-sustaining treatment.142 
The form turns the information and expressed desires into a physi-
cian’s order that is signed by the physician or advanced practice regis-
tered nurse and the individual, or his or her health care agent or sur-
rogate.143 The individual, or his or her health care agent or surrogate, is 
encouraged to discuss health care treatment decisions with the prima-
ry care doctor and document these decisions on a brightly colored 
POLST form, which is then signed by both the individual, his or her 
health care agent or surrogate, and the doctor.144 The form is lime 
green in color, so it easily can be found when needed and because it 
copies clearly on white paper.145 A plain white copy, completed cor-
rectly and signed by a doctor, is equally legal and valid.146 Briefly, a 
POLST contains orders in a standardized form and addresses a range 
of life-sustaining interventions with the patient’s preferences for in-
tensity of each intervention.147 The POLST gives an individual an op-
                                                                                                                             
 138. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327k (2016). 
 139. Id. § 327k-3. 
 140. Id. § 327k-2(C). 
 141. Id. § 327k-1 (“A provider orders for life-sustaining treatment form is not 
an advance health-care directive.”). 
 142. Health Care Decision Making, U. OF HAWAI’I ELDER L. PROGRAM, https:// 
www.hawaii.edu/uhelp/healthcare.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2017). 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. 
 145. POLST Information for Providers, HAWAII HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE CARE 
ORG., http://www.kokuamau.org/professionals/polst (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) 
[hereinafter POLST]. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id. 
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portunity to direct how life-sustaining health care treatment wishes, 
including a desire to have a pacemaker deactivated, are to be ad-
dressed.148 The form is recognized by the Hawaii Emergency Medical 
Services System,149 and although it does not replace the Comfort Care 
Only/Do Not Resuscitate Bracelet/Necklace, it provides immediately 
actionable directions pertaining to life-sustaining treatment and fol-
lows the patient between settings of care, including acute care hospi-
tals, nursing facilities, and community settings.150 
 Since the POLST form is not an advance directive and does not 
name an agent or surrogate, an individual should still consider 
providing individual instructions and appointing a health care agent 
through an advance directive. The combination of POLST and ad-
vance directive gives an individual the best opportunity to have 
health care treatment wishes followed, including a desire to have a 
pacemaker deactivated under certain circumstances. Individuals can 
ask their doctors about both types of forms. 
(But this is not) Suicide and Hawaii’s Blue Ribbon Panel 
on Living and Dying with Dignity 
 In 1997, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that 
terminally ill people do not have a constitutional right to physician-
assisted suicide.151 The court upheld laws in New York State and Wash-
ington State that make it a crime for physicians to give life-ending drugs 
to mentally competent but terminally ill patients who no longer want to 
live.152 
 The Court set forth the nation’s “history, legal traditions, and 
practices”153 to establish the “longstanding expressions of the States’ 
commitment to the protection and preservation of all human life.”154 
The Court indicated that “for over 700 years, the Anglo-American 
common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both 
suicide and assisting suicide.”155 
                                                                                                                             
 148. See id. 
 149. Comfort Care Only, supra note 137. 
 150. POLST, supra note 145.  
 151. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 701, 02 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 
793, 793 (1997). 
 152. Washington, 521 U.S. at 702; Vacco. 521 U.S. at 793. 
 153. Washington, 521 U.S. at 710. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 711. 
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 Then, the Court implicated a number of state interests: preser-
vation of life; protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profes-
sion; protecting vulnerable groups, including poor and elderly, from 
abuse, neglect, and mistakes; and preventing a slippery slope toward 
voluntary, or even involuntary, euthanasia.156 Ultimately, the Court 
held that the ban against physician-assisted suicide was reasonable 
due to the overwhelming state interests.157 Although the Court held 
that Washington’s assisted-suicide ban did not violate the Due Process 
Clause, the Court reiterated, “[t]he Due Process Clause protects the 
traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.”158 
 Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, stated that there is a 
“possibility that an individual plaintiff seeking to hasten her death, or 
a doctor whose assistance was sought, could prevail in a more par-
ticularized challenge.”159 Justice Stevens also states that there are times 
where hastening death is legitimate and “entitled to constitutional 
protection.”160 
 In Vacco v. Quill,161 the United States Supreme Court held that 
New York’s prohibition on assisting suicide did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.162 “Everyone, re-
gardless of physical condition, is entitled, if competent, to refuse un-
wanted lifesaving medical treatment; no one is permitted to assist in 
suicide. Generally speaking, laws that apply evenhandedly to all ‘un-
questionably comply’ with the Equal Protection Clause.”163 The Court 
held that New York’s ban was rationally related to several of the state 
interests: “prohibiting intentional killing and preserving life; prevent-
ing suicide; maintaining physicians’ role as their patients’ healers; 
protecting vulnerable people from indifference, prejudice, and psy-
chological and financial pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a 
possible slide towards euthanasia[.]”164 
 In distinguishing the difference between assisting suicide and 
withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment, the Court points to a 
weak explanation of causation and intent.165 “A doctor who assists a 
                                                                                                                             
 156. Id. at 728-32. 
 157. Id. at 742. 
 158. Id. at 720.  
 159. Id. at 750. 
 160. Id. at 742. 
 161. See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 793. 
 162. Id. at 796-97. 
 163. Id. at 800. 
 164. Id. at 808-9. 
 165. See generally U.S. v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980). 
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suicide . . . ‘must, necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily that 
the patient be made dead.’”166 Withdrawing life-sustaining medical 
treatment, like assisting suicide, would ultimately lead to a patient’s 
death; life-sustaining treatment sustains a patient’s life, and without it, 
the patient will die. The Court held that, as a matter of causation and 
intent, “when a patient refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, he 
dies from an underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient in-
gests lethal medication prescribed by a physician, he is killed by that 
medication.”167 Moreover, the right to refuse treatment is not limited to 
terminally ill patients.168 In Vacco, the Court held that, “[e]veryone, re-
gardless of physical condition, is entitled, if competent, to refuse un-
wanted lifesaving medical treatment; no one is permitted to assist a 
suicide.”169 As a life-sustaining treatment, a CIED should be consid-
ered a treatment that can be withheld or withdrawn and such with-
holding or withdrawal of this medical treatment should not be con-
sidered assisted suicide. 
 In 1997, Governor Benjamin Cayetano established a Blue Ribbon 
Panel on Living and Dying with Dignity to explore the issues of living 
and dying with dignity in Hawaii.170 On June 8, 1998, the Blue Ribbon 
Panel presented its final report.171 The panel reached unanimous agree-
ment on six major areas affecting most of the deaths that occur in Hawaii 
every year.172 Panel members differed only on Physician-Assisted Death 
and Physician-Assisted Suicide (PAD and PAS).173 
 The Blue Ribbon Panel was unanimous on the following points: 
• Spiritual counseling should be made more available to individuals 
who are afflicted with life threatening illnesses by integrating 
those services more fully into the healthcare system; 
                                                                                                                             
 166. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 802. 
 167. Id. at 801. 
 168. Id. at 800. 
 169. Id.  
 170. FINAL REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON LIVING AND 
DYING WITH DIGNITY, 27 (May 1998) [hereinafter BLUE RIBBON REPORT]. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 10. Physician Assisted Death: Deliberate action taken with the intent 
to hasten the death of another individual at the request and consent of the indi-
vidual. Voluntary Active Euthanasia is another term that may be used to describe 
this action.  
Physician Assisted Suicide: A physician provides an individual with the means by 
which the individual may take their own life. The primary intent of the physician 
is to cause the death of the individual. The means may include the provision of 
medication or a prescription, or taking other measures. The person who dies di-
rectly takes their own life. 
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• Public and healthcare professional education programs should be 
designed and implemented to increase awareness of the choices 
available to the dying; 
• The content of advance directives for healthcare, including “living 
wills,” should be made more specific, their use more widespread, 
and their provisions more binding; 
• Hospice care should be made more available and offered more ex-
pediently to the dying; 
• Effective pain management programs should be required in all 
healthcare institutions; 
• Involuntary euthanasia should continue to be a crime.174 
 The overall premise of the governor’s charge to the committee 
was that “[d]ying has not been managed as it could be.”175 Healthcare 
decisions, including end-of-life decisions, are made every day by pa-
tients or their authorized representatives, along with their physicians 
or other healthcare providers. Family members, friends, judges, 
guardians, agents, surrogates, and even attorneys are now commonly 
involved in what is usually thought of as a private concern of the pa-
tient and healthcare provider.176 
 Even if the risk of death is increased, the American Psychologi-
cal Association recognizes that “the reasoning on which a terminally 
ill person (whose judgments are not impaired by mental disorders) 
bases a decision to end his or her life is fundamentally different from 
the reasoning a clinically depressed person uses to justify suicide.”177 
Although there is no law against suicide in Hawaii, the Hawaii Penal 
Code has been interpreted to prohibit physicians from assisting in sui-
cides or otherwise helping to cause a death.178 As in other jurisdictions, 
                                                                                                                             
 174. Id. at 5. 
 175. Id. at 4-5 (“Technologic advances have made the prolongation of life an 
expectation. Healthcare providers rarely recommend an acceptance of death even 
when it is clearly the most rational decision. Hospice care, a reasonable alternative 
to futile medical care, is not considered often or early enough. Pain control so criti-
cal to the dying is often poorly administered.”). 
 176. Health Care Decision Making, U. OF HAW. ELDER. L. PROGRAM, https:// 
www.hawaii.edu/uhelp/healthcare.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2017). 
 177. Rhea K. Farberman, Terminal Illness and Hastened Death Requests: The Im-
portant Role of the Mental Health Professional, 28 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 544, 
544 (1997).  
 178. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-702 (2003). This section states in part: “A 
person commits the offense of manslaughter if. . .[h]e intentionally causes another 
person to commit suicide.” BLUE RIBBON REPORT, supra note 170, at 24, 49 (referring to 
the provision as the basis for concluding that PAS and PAD are illegal. However, in 
the author’s conversation with the City and County of Honolulu Prosecutor’s Office, it 
was apparent that the issue is not clear as seen in the author’s personal communica-
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Hawaii law often treats the subject of suicide in the context of mental 
illness. For example, Hawaii provides, in part, that if a person is be-
lieved to be mentally ill or suffering from substance abuse and is im-
minently dangerous to self or others, that person may be subjected to 
involuntary emergency examination and hospitalization.179 There also 
are provisions that justify the use of physical force to prevent another 
from attempting suicide under specific circumstances.180 Finally, the 
penal code addresses suicide by requiring coroners to report the death 
of an individual if it appears that suicide is the cause.181 The penalty 
for failing to report such a death is a fine of $100.182 
 A law enacted in 1976 in Hawaii declared that the state did not 
condone, authorize, or approve of mercy killing or euthanasia.183 In 1999, 
this law was replaced by the UHCDA, and the provision regarding 
withholding or withdrawing medical treatment, which is more neutral184 
and which tracks very closely the Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Re-
striction Act of 1997 as previously indicated in this article.185 The ques-
tion becomes: if deactivation of a pacemaker is not for the purpose of 
causing, or for the purpose of assisting in causing, the death of any 
individual, and/or it is considered withdrawal of medical treatment, 
would this be considered assisted suicide? 
                                                                                                                             
tions with Peter Carlisle, City and County of Honolulu Prosecutor’s Office, Jan., 2003 
and Feb. 26, 2004). 
 179. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334-59 (1997).  
 180. Id. § 703-308.  
 181. Id. § 841-3. 
 182. Id.  
 183. See id. § 327D-131 (repealed 1999) (Mercy killing or euthanasia prohibit-
ed).  
 184. Id. § 327E-13. Effect of this chapter, provides: . . . (b) Death resulting from 
the withholding or withdrawal of healthcare in accordance with this chapter shall 
not for any purpose constitute a suicide or homicide or legally impair or invalidate 
a policy of insurance or an annuity providing a death benefit, notwithstanding any 
term of the policy or annuity to the contrary. (c) This chapter shall not authorize 
mercy killing, assisted suicide, euthanasia, or the provision, withholding, or with-
drawal of healthcare, to the extent prohibited by other statutes of this State. 
 185. Id. § 327D-131 (repealed 1999) (“(b) Construction and treatment of certain 
services. Nothing in subsection (a) of this section, or in any other provision of this 
chapter (or in any amendment made by this chapter), shall be construed to apply 
to or to affect any limitation relating to—  
(1) the withholding or withdrawing of medical treatment or medical care; 
(2) the withholding or withdrawing of nutrition or hydration; 
(3) abortion; or 
(4) the use of an item, good, benefit, or service furnished for the purpose of allevi-
ating pain or discomfort, even if such use may increase the risk of death, so long as 
such item, good, benefit, or service is not also furnished for the purpose of causing, 
or the purpose of assisting in causing, death, for any reason.”). 
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 While the Army’s apparent position186 is that deactivation is 
never permitted in Army hospitals, even in Hawaii since it is a federal 
facility.187 The Navy and the Air Force seem to have different opin-
ions.188  The Department of Veterans Affairs has addressed the issue in 
                                                                                                                             
 186. As of December 2016, the author had not received any confirmation or 
clarification of its position as communicated to the patient and the patient’s cardi-
ologist despite repeated requests. These are the questions the author has been ask-
ing the Army to answer, starting in May 2016 and ending in December of 2016.  
Questions: 
(1) If deactivation of a pacemaker is not for the purpose of causing, or 
for the purpose of assisting in causing, the death of any individual, 
and/or it is considered withdrawal of medical treatment, would this 
be considered assisted suicide in a military health system? 
(2) In addressing cardiology issues, does the Army follow clinical 
practice guidelines such as those developed by the ACC/AHA/HRS? 
(3) As military hospital systems become more integrated (e.g., Walter 
Reed National Military Medical Center) how are clinical policies de-
veloped, if there are no published VA/DoD CPGs—Army, Navy or 
Air Force lead?  
 187. 42 U.S.C. § 14401 (1997) (“(c) Limitation on Federal facilities and employ-
ees Subject to subsection (b) of this section, with respect to health care items and 
services furnished—  
(1) by or in a health care facility owned or operated by the Federal government, or 
(2) by any physician or other individual employed by the Federal government to 
provide health care services within the scope of the physician’s or individual’s 
employment, no such item or service may be furnished for the purpose of causing, 
or for the purpose of assisting in causing, the death of any individual, such as by 
assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing. 
(d) List of programs to which restrictions apply  
(1) Federal health care funding programs Subsection (a) of this section applies to 
funds appropriated under or to carry out the following:  
(A) Medicare program Title XVIII of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq.]. 
(B) Medicaid program Title XIX of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq.]. 
(C) Title XX social services block grant Title XX of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 
1397 et seq.]. 
(D) Maternal and child health block grant program Title V of the Social Security 
Act [42 U.S.C. 701 et seq.]. 
(E) The Public Health Service Act [42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.]. 
(F) The Indian Health Care Improvement Act [25 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.]. 
(G) Federal employees health benefits program Chapter 89 of title 5.  
(H) Military health care system (including Tricare and CHAMPUS programs) 
Chapter 55 of title 10.  
(I) Veterans medical care Chapter 17 of title 38.  
(J) Health services for Peace Corps volunteers Section 2504(e) of title 22. 
(K) Medical services for Federal prisoners Section 4005(a) of title 18. 
(2) Federal facilities and personnel: The provisions of subsection (c) of this section 
apply to facilities and personnel of the following:  
(A) Military health care system: The Department of Defense operating under chap-
ter 55 of title 10.  
(B) Veterans medical care: The Veterans Health Administration of the Department 
of Veterans Affairs. 
(C) Public Health Service”). 
 188. E-mail from Air Force Cardiologist and Air Force Electrophysiologist, to 
James H. Pietsch (July 8, 2016; Nov. 29, 2016) (on file with author) (An Air Force 
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the past and concluded that it may not only be ethically and legally 
appropriate to deactivate a pacemaker under certain conditions but 
that “(a) patient with decision-making capacity has the legal right to 
refuse or request the withdrawal of any medical treatment or inter-
vention, regardless of whether s/he is terminally ill, and regardless of 
whether the treatment prolongs life and its withdrawal results in 
death.”189 
                                                                                                                             
Cardiologist and an Air Force Electrophysiologist indicated that the Air Force does 
not have a formal policy for deactivating pacemakers. They said, “[d]eactivation of 
pacemakers is handled on a case-by-case basis involving close coordination be-
tween patient and provider.”); see also End of Life Heart Rhythm Devices, HEART & 
RHYTHM SOC. (2014), 
http://www.hrsonline.org/content/download/21396/940307/file/End%20of%20
Life%20and%20Heart%20Rhythm%20Devices.pdf; e-mail from a Navy Cardiolo-
gist to James H. Pietsch (Nov. 2, 2016) (on file with author) (A Navy Cardiologist 
indicated, “The Navy follows the clinical guidelines and consensus statements of 
the ACC/AHA/HRS and other clinical societies. There is no Department of the 
Navy (DON) or Bureau of Medicine (BUMED) written policies.”). 
 189. E-mail from Dept. of Vet. Aff. Med. Dr. to James H. Pietsch (Dec. 13, 2016) 
(on file with author) (stating, “I have reviewed your request with my Chief Dr. 
Berkowitz, copied on this e-mail. The 2006 National Center for Ethics in Health 
Care teleconference you have already seen remains the best statement of our posi-
tion and we would refer you to that document for the questions you posed.”); Dr. 
Ken Berkowitz, Ethical Considerations of Cardiac Pacemakers and Implantable Defibril-
lators for End-of-Life Care, www.ethics.va.gov/.../NET_Topic_2006045_Cardiac_ 
Pacemakers_and_Implantable_Defibrillators.doc. Dr. Ken Berkowitz is the Chief of 
the Ethics Consultation Service at the VHA National Center for Ethics in Health 
Care and a physician at the VA NY Harbor Healthcare System. On April 25, 2006, 
Dr. Berkowitz, Susan Own, PhD., and Joel Roselin, MTS conducted a National Eth-
ics Teleconference. The VHA Center sponsors teleconferences such as this one to 
provide an opportunity for regular education and open discussion of ethical con-
cerns relevant to the VHA. This teleconference focuses on identifying and discuss-
ing ethical considerations of cardiac pacemakers and implantable defibrillators for 
end-of-life care and relevant VHA policies regarding withholding and withdrawal 
of life-sustaining medical treatment. Three main issues are discussed during the 
teleconference:  
(1) Is it ethically permissible to disable the implanted cardiac devices 
for a patient who is actively dying? 
(2) Are such implanted devices different from any other kinds of sup-
portive measures that patients and their surrogates can request to 
have withdrawn? 
(3) Are there limits to how far clinicians must go to accommodate the 
requests of patients or surrogates to have treatments discontinued?  
Mr. Roselin begins by briefly describing the difference between the two 
main types of cardiac support devices: pacemakers and defibrillators. According to 
Roselin, pacemakers help the heart maintain a regular rhythm by sensing the 
rhythm and, if necessary, sending a pulse to the heart’s conduction system to trig-
ger the heart to contract. Most pacemakers only pace the heart intermittently, 
while others work constantly, allowing a slow heart to beat at a more appropriate 
rate. Usually, pacemakers cannot be turned off from outside the body, but can be 
turned down low enough to essentially render them useless. However, since 
pacemakers support the heart’s natural yet inadequate rhythm, deactivating them 
rarely hastens death. Rather, deactivation of a pacemaker may simply diminish a 
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patient’s quality of life and result in “a poorer quality of death.” However, accord-
ing to Dr. Berkowitz, proper palliative care can readily avoid this problem.  
Defibrillators are most commonly used to treat patients who are at risk of sudden 
death from ventricular tachycardia and ventricular fibrillation. A defibrillator can 
sense these conditions and discharge a sudden electrical impulse so the heart can 
regain an organized rhythm. Unlike pacemakers, defibrillators can be completely 
turned off from outside the body and deactivation is much more likely to lead to 
death because the defibrillator-shock effectively resuscitates the patient. Without 
the electrical impulse, the heart will not regain the ability to beat correctly.   
The devices are similar in that they are both implantable, charged by batteries, and 
can be reprogrammed from outside the body.  
According to the panel, the fundamental ethical question is whether it is ethically 
permissible to disable an implantable defibrillator in a patient who is actively dy-
ing and who has either through themselves or their surrogate requested that the 
device be disabled. Dr. Owen explains that deactivation is not only ethically per-
missible but ethically required. This requirement is supported by established med-
ical-ethical principles and VHA policy.  
VHA policy promotes shared decision-making, supports the right of a capable pa-
tient to refuse life-sustaining treatment, and authorizes the surrogate to make deci-
sions on behalf of the patient when appropriate. Dr. Owen emphasizes that such 
treatment refusals should be honored. A patient’s right to refuse treatment is codi-
fied in Handbook 1004.1, VHA Informed Consent for Clinical Treatments and Pro-
cedures which allows a patient to refuse or request withdrawal of any treatment, 
even life-sustaining treatments. Furthermore, withdrawal or withholding treat-
ment must follow VHA informed consent policy.   
The bioethical principle of respect for individual autonomy supports the patient’s 
right to refuse treatment and the physician’s duty to comply with informed con-
sent policy. Patients have the right to accept or reject treatment based on their own 
values, context, and treatment goals.  
The conversation continues to clear up some common misconceptions regarding 
the issue. Dr. Owen concedes correcting certain misconceptions may aid in con-
sistent application of VHA policy. First, the panel maintains that the governing 
ethical tenants are no different for cardiac devices than they are for other life-
sustaining treatments, such as mechanical ventilation. With all treatments, the pa-
tient has the right to decide whether to discontinue. Furthermore, the surrogate is 
free to decide on the patient’s behalf, based first on the patient’s wishes, and if 
these are not known, on the patient’s best interest. Second, the process of disabling 
these devices is non-invasive and painless. Third, disabling such devices is not eu-
thanasia or assisted suicide because the underlying disease process causes the pa-
tient’s death, rather than the patient or surrogate who authorizes the treatment 
refusal or the physician who implements it. Finally, intent matters for the ethical 
question as well, but here, the intent behind the treatment withdrawal is to honor 
and respect the patient’s or authorized surrogate’s decision. The intent is not to 
cause the patient’s death. 
Problems still arise because:  
• Protocols about implementation have not kept pace with the technology itself 
but, there is a general consensus among ethicists, clinicians, and legal schol-
ars that there is no difference between withholding and withdrawing treat-
ments, the reasons that would justify the withholding treatment in the first 
place, might also justify the withdrawal  
•  “A patient with decision-making capacity has the legal right to refuse or re-
quest the withdrawal of any medical treatment or intervention, regardless of 
whether s/he is terminally ill, and regardless of whether the treatment pro-
longs life and its withdrawal results in death.” Under “Informed Consent and 
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 Even the Catholic Health Association, appears to have a more 
nuanced approach than the Army.190 
                                                                                                                             
the Right to Refuse Treatment” namely in the paragraph beginning with “The 
corollary to informed consent is….” 
• “When a patient lacks capacity, his/her legally-defined surrogate decision- 
maker has the same right to refuse or request the withdrawal of treatment as 
the patient would have if the patient had decision-making capacity.” under 
“Surrogate decision making” 
• “Legally, carrying out a request to withdraw life-sustaining treatment is nei-
ther physician-assisted suicide nor euthanasia.” further under “Common con-
cerns related to withdrawing CIED therapies” subsection: “Concern: Is with-
drawing a CIED therapy akin to assisted suicide or euthanasia?” 
• “The right to refuse or request the withdrawal of a treatment is a personal 
right of the patient and does not depend on the characteristics of the particu-
lar treatment involved (i.e., CIEDs). Therefore, no treatment, including CIED 
therapies, has unique ethical or legal status.” Under subsection “Concern: are 
there unique factors about CIED therapy that differentiate it from other life-
sustaining therapies?” 
 190. See Ron Hamel, Implantable Cardiac Devices at Life’s End: Is Deactivation 
Morally Licit? ETHICS CATH. HEALTH ASS’N (2010), https://www.chausa.org/ 
docs/default-source/hceusa/bibliography-implantable-cardiac-devices-at-life's-
end.pdf?sfvrsn=0. “Deactivation ought not be a means for bringing death 
about . . . ” Rather, deactivation should be about allowing the underlying disease 
process to run its course unfettered, and to provide comfort to the patient in the 
process. This article discusses the nature of the devices, major conclusions and rec-
ommendations of the Heart Rhythm Society consensus statement, and how deacti-
vation of the devices might fit into the Catholic moral tradition. The article dis-
cusses the key recommendations of the Heart Rhythm Society’s consensus 
statement, which draws upon legal precedence of autonomy, beneficence, non-
maleficence, and justice. These well-established principles give a patient the legal 
right to withdraw/withhold any medical treatment whether the treatment pro-
longs life and withdrawal will result in death and have a surrogate make decisions 
in the event of incapacitation. The Consensus Statement concludes that withdraw-
al of life-sustaining treatment is neither physician-assisted suicide nor euthanasia 
because the intent of withdrawing/withholding is to remove unwanted medical 
treatment, and ultimate cause of death is an underlying medical dis-
ease/condition. Finally, if deactivation is against the physician’s personal moral 
values, they are not required to carry it out (p.4). However, the physician should 
not abandon the patient but help find a colleague who is willing to follow the pa-
tient’s wishes.  
This article then discusses how CIED-deactivation fits into the Catholic moral tra-
dition. First of all, the device should be assessed just like any other type of life-
sustaining medical treatment, even though they are implanted into the body (p.4). 
According to Dr. Hamel, the key moral consideration is not where the device is 
situated but what the benefits and burdens the device places on the patient.  
Second, contrary to the Heart Rhythm Society’s statement, personal autonomy is 
not the principal factor in considering the morality of deactivation. The Catholic 
moral tradition begins with an obligation to preserve life. Assessing whether deac-
tivation could be morally licit requires weighing the benefits and the burdens of 
the device for a particular person, taking into consideration the patient’s condition 
as a whole. Simply desiring deactivation does not make it morally sound. There-
fore, contrary to the HRS Consensus Statement, personal autonomy is important 
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A Familiar Tune? 
 Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Center191 is considered to be 
the military’s leading case on removal of life-sustaining treatment, the 
court relied heavily on a famous informed consent case, Canterbury v. 
Spence
192 in stating that “it is the patient, not the physician, who ulti-
mately decides if treatment-any treatment-is to be given at all.”193 Mrs. 
Tune was a terminally ill cancer patient at Walter Reed Army Medical 
Center, which was then located in the District of Columbia.194 She was 
being kept alive by a respirator, which she wanted disconnected so 
that she could die naturally.195 Although the doctors were sympathetic 
to her wishes, Army policy at that time precluded withdrawal of any 
life-support system once it was placed in operation and, as a federal 
institution, Walter Reed Army Medical Center was not (at that time) 
subject to the District of Columbia Natural Death Act.196 A guardian ad 
litem was appointed to ascertain Mrs. Tune’s state of health, her de-
sires, and her competence.197 All members of the family were in accord 
with the patient’s wishes.198 The Army concurred in all but the prayer 
for relief and even waived appellate review prior to the court’s deci-
sion.199 The court granted the patient’s petition and ordered that she be 
                                                                                                                             
but not a decisive factor in the decision to deactivate. According to Dr. Hamel, 
“when the benefits of a device offer little or no hope of benefit or when the bur-
dens of the device outweigh any benefits, there is a moral warrant for deactiva-
tion.”  
However, according to Dr. Hamel, deactivation is not morally licit solely because 
the patient no longer wants to live. If there are other circumstances in the patient’s 
life that create a desire not to live, deactivation is not permissible.  
Deactivation of ICDs is more frequently allowable because they can cause physical 
pain and mental anguish, diminishing the overall wellbeing of the patient at the 
end of their life. Pacemakers are different because they do not impose the same 
physical and mental burdens, do not necessarily prolong the dying process, and 
deactivation itself may be painful.  
 191. Tune v. Walter Reed Army Med. Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (D.D.C. 
1985). 
 192. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F. 2nd 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
1064 (1972). Canterbury generally “discarded the professional standard of disclo-
sure, replacing it with a ‘lay’ standard which effectively withdrew from the medi-
cal profession the right to determine what information must be disclosed to pa-
tients. See Alan Meisel, The Expansion of Liability for Medical Accidents: From 
Negligence to Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REV. 51, 96 (1977). 
 193. Tune, 602 F. Supp. at 1455.  
 194. Id. at 1452. 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. at 1453 n.2. 
 197. Id. at 1453.  
 198. Id. at 1454. 
 199. Id. 
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removed from life-support systems.200 The court concluded “a compe-
tent, mature patient has a right to be fully informed of the possible 
consequences of a course of treatment before he permits the medical 
ministrations to begin.”201 The informed consent doctrine as enunciat-
ed in Canterbury was an integral part of the court’s decision to remove 
life-support equipment.202 The Tune court found that, “[t]he rule has 
never been qualified in its application by either the nature or purpose 
of the treatment, or the gravity of the consequences of acceding to or 
foregoing it.”203 
 Later, the Army incorporated procedures for do-not-resuscitate 
and removal of life-support equipment into its regulations and now 
includes a provision that “(a) patient with decision making capacity 
has the legal and moral right to participate in medical care decisions, 
including the right to refuse medical treatment at any time even if the 
treatment is lifesaving.”204 
 As a retiree, the patient who is the subject of this article is not 
under military authority for purposes of health care treatment, but the 
courts have generally upheld that, like civilians, even members of the 
armed services are entitled to informed consent.205 Even in the context 
of military health care, the court acknowledges that there must be a 
balance between preservation of life, and the potential negative effects 
of continuing medical treatment.206 The court in Tune held, in the con-
text of an Army hospital terminating life support, that, “while preser-
vation of life in the abstract is no doubt a transcendant [sic] goal for 
any society which values human life, the state’s interest in maintain-
ing life must defer to the right to refuse treatment of a competent, 
emotionally stable, but terminally ill adult whose death is imminent 
and who is, therefore, the best, indeed, the only, true judge of how 
such life as remains to him may best be spent.”207 
 In a United States District Court, Doe v. Rumsfeld, the court held 
that the right to bodily integrity and importance of complying with 
legal requirements were among the highest public policy concerns.208 
                                                                                                                             
 200. Id. at 1456. 
 201. Id. at 1455. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Care, Army Regulation 40-3, 2-3 a (Sept. 
12, 2003), http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r40_3.pdf.  
 205. See generally Doe v. Rumsfeld, 297 F. Supp. 2d 119, 134 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Tune, 602 F. Supp. at 1455-56. 
 208. Doe, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 134. 
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In that case, the court ruled in favor of members of the armed services 
who asserted that their rights had been violated when the government 
did not obtain informed consent from the members before administer-
ing anthrax vaccinations.209 While the medical procedure here (deacti-
vation of a CIED) differs, that court ruling stands for the proposition 
that, even for military members, informed consent invokes matters of 
bodily integrity, and the requirement must be upheld “even if obtain-
ing informed consent were to significantly interfere with military 
function.”210 
 What information should an Army doctor or any doctor pro-
vide the patient about deactivation of CIEDs prior to implantation and 
during the course of the doctor-patient relationship? A series of arti-
cles in The Journal of the American Medical Association provides some 
insight into how to talk to patients, including “What Clinicians Can 
Say about Device Deactivation.”211 The Honolulu cardiologist the au-
thor questioned for this article follows such guidelines and suggests 
that such discussions should be included in the doctor-patient rela-
tionship. 
 The Federal Tort Claims Act makes a thorough knowledge of 
state law crucial to resolving tort issues, including issues relating to 
the negligent provision of informed consent.212 Section 2674 of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act provides that the United States “shall be lia-
ble . . . in the same manner and to the same extent as a private indi-
                                                                                                                             
 209. Id.  
 210. Id.  
 211. See e.g., Daniel D. Matlock & John M. Mandrola, The Antidote for Unpre-
pared Patients: A Caring Clinician, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 86, 86-87 (Jan. 1, 2014).  
What Clinicians Can Say about Device Deactivation At implantation: 
While the purpose of this device is to help you live a longer and better 
life, whether we like it or not, we all eventually die, and there will 
come a time when this device could be doing more harm than good. I 
want you to know that this device can be turned off at any time.  
I encourage you to think about this ahead of time. Talk with your 
family, and write down your wishes in a living will or an advance di-
rective. I’m committed to taking care of you for however long you 
have this device, and I’m happy to answer any questions you may 
have. 
During routine follow-up: 
It looks like things are going well for you right now. As we’ve talked 
about before, there may come a time when this device is no longer 
helping you, or it might even become burdensome.  
I don’t want to be morbid, but I just want to remind you that you 
have control here. We can turn the device off at any time. I’m commit-
ted to helping you, and I’m happy to answer any questions you may 
have. 
 212. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (2012). 
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vidual under like circumstances.”213 Section 1346(b) further provides 
that the federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims 
against the United States arising “under circumstances where the 
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission oc-
curred.”214 
 The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the sovereign immunity of 
the United States.215 But like any other waiver of sovereignty, the Act is 
subject to the restrictions and exceptions imposed by Congress.216 This 
is where we started the inquiry of whether deactivation of a pacemak-
er violates the Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 
1997.217  
The University of Hawaii Elder Law Program sponsored a 
Spring 2017 seminar in conjunction with the law school’s Elder Law-
Veterans Focus Clinic. Approximately 200 persons attended. One of 
the topics was “Medical, Legal and Ethical Considerations in Deacti-
vation of Pacemakers.” The patient who is the subject of this article 
was a panelist as was his Army doctor (not in uniform), a civilian car-
diologist, a Department of Veterans Affairs Geriatric Psychiatrist and 
the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the Elder Justice Unit of the City 
and County of Honolulu Office of the Prosecutor. Legal representa-
tives from the Army Medical Center and Army Regional Health 
Command had also been invited to be on the panel but none partici-
pated. The consensus of the panel, each speaking on his or her own 
behalf and not on behalf of any organization, was that a mentally ca-
pacitated individual who is not under any undue influence has the 
right to request that his or her pacemaker be deactivated and that, un-
der most circumstances, deactivation would not constitute suicide or 
assisted suicide.  
Two months after the seminar, and nearly a year after he first 
contacted the author, the patient who is the subject of this article sent 
an email to let the author know that, as a service-connected disabled 
                                                                                                                             
 213. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012).  
 214. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012). 
 215. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957). The Court goes so 
far as to say “the very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to waive the Govern-
ment’s traditional all-encompassing immunity from tort actions and to establish 
novel and unprecedented governmental liability.” 
 216. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1953). 
 217. 42 U.S.C. § 14401 (2012). 
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veteran, he is entitled to receive healthcare services at the VA Medical 
Center (which is co-located on the same campus as the Army Medical 
Center) and he has asked the VA “…if I request that my pacemaker be 
turned off is there a procedure where I can have it done at or by the 
V.A.?” He also said he would be interested in having the author and 
Elder Law —Veterans Focus Clinic help him submit a request for as-
sistance to the Army Regional Health Command Inspector General 
(IG) to provide clarification on Army policies and procedures with re-
spect to deactivation of pacemakers in Army healthcare facilities.218  
Stay tuned. 
 
                                                                                                                             
 218. See Army Regulation 20-1, Inspector General Activities and Procedures, 
November 29, 2010, Chapter 6–1. a. Assistance as an inspector general function.  
Assistance is the IG function that provides Soldiers, Family members, DA civilians, 
retirees, and contract employees the ability to seek help from the IG on matters 
affecting their health, welfare, and personal readiness. 
 
